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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
•00O00-

TAMMY HERRING (LAMB),
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vCase No. 910018
(Priority 16)

B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., an
Arizona corporation, and
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Delaware corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
-00O00-

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE KENNETH R. RIGTRUP

JURISDICTION
1.

Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear this Appeal.
2.

This Appeal is from judgments and final orders

(denominated (1) Order and Judgment [granting defendant Curtis
Industries7 Motion for Summary Judgment], dated June 13, 1990;
(2) Judgment on the Verdict [in favor of defendant B & B
Amusements], dated September 18, 1990; and (3) Order [denying
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial], dated December 5, 1990)

1

entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah (the Honorable Kenneth R. Rigtrup).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether, in this two-defendant tort action, the

District Court committed reversible error in granting defendant-appellee Curtis Industries/ Motion for Summary Judgment
and, thereby, denying plaintiff-appellant Ms. Lamb her day in
court against that defendant and affording the remaining
defendant-appellee, B & B Amusements, an "empty chair" at which
that defendant might point.
The applicable standard of appellate review regarding
this issue is summarized as follows:
"We accord no deference to a trial court's
legal conclusions given to support the
grant of a summary judgment, but review
them for correctness." Madsen v. Borthick,
769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). In reviewing summary judgments, all the evidence and
reasonable inferences are liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the
motion. The court is free to reappraise
the trial court's legal conclusions.
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d
1033, 1039 (Utah 1989). "[W]hen on an
appeal from a motion for summary judgment,
we inquire whether there is any genuine
issue as to any material fact and, if there
is not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Arrow Indus, v. Zions First National
Bank.
767 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1988).l

Credit for this and other statements of the appropriate
standard of appellate review is given to Judge Norman Jackson
of the Utah Court of Appeals, with those statements being
taken, verbatim, from Judge Jackson's "Suiomary of Standards of
Review."
2

2.

Whether the District Court committed reversible error

in ruling that the standard of care, with respect to Ms. Lamb's
claim against B & B Amusements, was simple negligence, as
opposed to the extraordinarily high standard of care to which
common carriers are held.
The applicable standard of appellate review regarding
this issue is summarized as follows:
An appeal challenging the refusal to give
jury instructions presents questions of law
only. Therefore, we grant no particular
deference to the trial court's rulings.
Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah
1989).
3.

Whether the District Court committed reversible error

in allowing (given the procedural history of the case and
given, specifically, its granting of the Curtis Industries
Motion for Summary Judgment) B & B Amusements' expert to give
the testimony he gave (including his conclusion that the
subject accident was, most likely, the result of a defective or
"flawed" bolt or of a "counterfeit" bolt).
The applicable standard of appellate review regarding
this issue is summarized as follows:
Admissibility of Evidence: "It is well
settled that trial court rulings on the
admissibility of evidence are not to be
overturned in the absence of a clear abuse
of discretion." State v. Griffiths. 752
P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (citing State v.
Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); Utah
R. Evid. 103(a)); accord State v. Aase. 762
P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1988); State v.
Jamison. 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. 1989).

3

"In reviewing questions of admissibility of
evidence at trial, deference is given to
the trial court's advantageous position;
thus, that court's rulings regarding admissibility will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion." Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 101 Utah Adv. Rep.
(1989) ;
4.

Whether the District Court committed reversible error

in denying Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New Trial and rejecting,
specifically, in addition to the Rule 59(a)(7) "error in law"
arguments appertaining to the foregoing three claims of error,
Ms. Lamb's Rule 59(a)(3) argument regarding "surprise" and her
Rule 59(a)(6) argument regarding "insufficiency of the evidence ."
The applicable standard of appellate review regarding
this issue is summarized as follows:
"We consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and we will not
overturn that verdict when it is supported
by substantial and competent evidence."
Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. DaIton, 745 P.2d
1239, 1242 (Utah 1987); accord Von Hake v.
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).
Resolution of factual dispute is a matter
for the jury which will not be upset on
appeal unless evidence on the issue "'so
clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would not
differ on the outcome of the case./M
Cambelt. 745 P.2d at 1242 (quoting E.A.
Strout Western Realty Agency. Inc. v. W.C.
Fov & Sons. Inc.. 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah
1983)) .
M/

To successfully attack the verdict, an
appellant must marshall all the evidence
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate
that, even viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to that verdict, the
4

evidence is insufficient to support it.'11
Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242 (quoting Von Hake
at 769, which in turn cites Scharf v. BMG
Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068f 1070 (Utah 1985));
see id. at 1242 n.l (Scharf burden still
relevant to challenge to jury's factfinding
after 1987 amendment of R.52(a)).
A trial court's grant or denial of a motion
for new trial will not be overturned on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc..
748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); Moon Lake
Electr. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. Constr.
Inc.. 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah App. 1989).
The general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that the appellate court "will
presume that the discretion of the trial
court was properly exercised unless the
record clearly shows the contrary."
Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35
(Utah 1984) (quoted with approval in
Donohue. 748 P.2d at 1068). But a trial
court has no discretion to grant a new
trial absent a showing of at least one of
the grounds set forth in Rule 59(a).
Tanaaro v. Marrero. 13 Utah 2d 290f 373
P.2d 390, 391 n.2 (1969); Moon Lake. 767
P.2d at 128.
"[A]n insufficiency-of-the-evidence based
challenge to a denial of [a Rule 59(a)(6)
new trial motion] is governed by one standard of review: we reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart.
761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988) (citing King v.
Fereday. 739 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Utah 1987);
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown &
Gunnel1, 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986).
Appellants making such a claim must marshall all the evidence supporting the verdict and then show that the evidence cannot
support the verdict. Hansen. 761 P.2d at
18.
If the Motion was denied, the appellate
court is to sustain the denial if there was
5

"an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision." Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730,
732 (Utah 1982). The appellate court can
reverse the denial of the motion only if
"the evidence to support the verdict was
completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable or unjust." Id. (quoting
McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah
1977)).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Ms. Lamb seeks reversal of the granting of the Curtis
Industries Motion for Summary Judgment, reversal of the Judgment on the Verdict in favor of B & B, and remand to the
District Court with instructions that one new trial be held, at
which both defendants will appear as defendants.

She also

seeks her costs of court, assessable against both defendants,
in connection with this Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Tammy Herring (Lamb)2 was injured on or about
September 4, 1986, while attending the Utah State Fair.

The

concessionaire at the fair was defendant-appellee B & B Amusements Corp. ("B & B"), an Arizona corporation.

The accident

occurred while plaintiff, with her three-year-old son, was
riding the children's roller coaster owned and operated by B &
B.

2

Ms. Lamb was between her two marriages at the time of the
subject accident and at the time of the initiation of the
lawsuit. Her first husband is surnamed Herring. Shortly
before trial, plaintiff remarried. She is now known as Tammy
Lamb.
6

Ms. Lamb and her son were riding in the third car of a
five-car train when the second and third cars of that train
became separated while the train was in motion.

Ms. Lamb

allegedly sustained serious bodily injuries as a result of the
separation of the cars.
Ms. Lamb filed her Complaint against B & B, alleging,
inter alia, negligence in the maintenance and/or inspection of
the subject train.

In response to an Interrogatory, B & B

stated that the reason that the cars had separated was that a
bolt connecting the cars had broken.

In response to a later

Interrogatory, B & B identified defendant-appellee Curtis
Industries, Inc. ("Curtis") as the manufacturer and seller to B
& B of the subject bolt.

After obtaining that information,

Ms. Lamb (without necessarily accepting the proposition that
the bolt broke (as opposed to its having fallen out after
losing its restraining nut or cotter pin)) amended her Complaint to name Curtis as an additional defendant and asserted
claims against that defendant sounding in strict products
liability and negligence in connection with Curtis7s manufacture and sale of the subject bolt to B & B.
Both defendants moved for summary judgment.

Judge Rigtrup

denied the B & B Motion, but granted the Curtis Motion.3

3

The Curtis Motion was primarily based on the fact that
Ms. Lamb's expert witness was of the opinion that the fault in
connection with the separation lay entirely with B & B. Judge
Rigtrup issued no memorandum opinion accompanying his granting
(continued...)
7

Ms. Lamb then sought—unsuccessfully—via pre-trial motions, to prevent B & B from putting on evidence supporting the
proposition that the separation of the cars was due to a
defective bolt.

At trial, B & B's expert offered his opinion

that the most likely explanation for the separation was that a
"flawed" bolt broke.

Six of the eight jurors answered in the

negative to the first question on the special verdict form, to
wit:

"Was B & B Amusements negligent?"

Judge Rigtrup entered

Judgment of No Cause of Action on that Verdict.
Ms. Lamb then filed a Motion for a New Trial, contending
that she should be granted a new trial against both defendants
and, specifically, that Judge Rigtrup erred, as a matter of
law, in (1) granting the Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment;
(2) failing to instruct the jury that an extraordinarily high
standard of care, such as that imposed by law on common carriers, was the standard to which B & B should be held; and (3)
allowing (given the procedural history of the case and given,
specifically, the Court's granting of the Curtis Motion for
Summary Judgment) B & B's expert to give the said opinion

3

(...continued)
of the Curtis Motion, but he did issue a Minute Entry (Record
at 504). It appears that he based his ruling on his view that
res ipsa loquitur does not apply to strict liability issues and
on his belief that no evidence of negligence would be presented
at trial against Curtis, given Ms. Lamb's expert's opinion, and
given the fact that neither the bolt nor any part thereof could
be produced as evidence (B & B's agents having testified in
depositions that they found and discarded the only part of the
bolt that they claimed was found).
8

testimony he gave.

Ms. Lamb also contended, in connection with

that New Trial Motion, (a) that she was, in the rubric of Rule
59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudicially
surprised by the Court's allowing B & B's expert to testify as
he did, in light of, among other things, the Court's granting
of the Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment, B & B's agents'
supposed discarding of the supposedly broken bolt, and B & B's
failure to supplement, prior to trial, its answers to
Ms. Lamb's expert-witness Interrogatories; and (b) that, in the
rubric of Rule 59(a)(6) of these Rules, there was insufficient
evidence to support the verdict of B & B's non-negligence.
Judge Rigtrup denied Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New Trial,
and this Appeal ensued.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following is a statement of facts and procedural
history material to a consideration of the questions presented:
1.

On or about September 4, 1986, while attending the

Utah State Fair, and while, specifically, she and her son were
riding, for a fare (Tr. at 264), a "kiddie" roller coaster
owned and operated by B & B, Ms. Lamb was injured.

She claims

to have suffered severe and permanent neck and related injuries, including debilitating and disabling headaches.

She put

on evidence that she had incurred, up to the time of trial,
medical expenses in the principal amount of $7,948.37 (Trial
Exhibit 10); and lost income, up to the time of trial, in the

9

amount of $31,862.00 (Trial Exhibit 19). She also put on
evidence, through expert testimony, of future economic losses
of a then-present value in excess of $600,000.00 (Trial Exhibit
19).
2.

B & B took the position, at trial, that Ms. Lamb

reported, in the immediate aftermath of the incident, that she
had sustained an injury, albeit a relatively very minor one,
consisting of bumps to her knees suffered when the subject cars
separated.

Tr. at 60 (testimony of Buddy Mertin, B & B's

president); Tr. at 460 (testimony of Dr. Tom Blotter, B & B's
expert).
3.

B & B contends that the disconnection of the two cars

of the kiddie roller coaster was caused by a bolt that broke
(e.g., Buddy Mertin testimony, Tr. at 69-81); and that B & B
people, possibly as many as six, searched for an hour to find
the parts of the bolt, found one part of the bolt, did not find
the other part, and discarded the part of the bolt that they
did find (Buddy Mertin testimony, Tr. at 71-75).
4.

B & B purchased the bolt from Curtis.

B & B's Answer

to Interrogatory No. 1 of Plaintiffs' Second Set Interrogatories.
5.

Ms. Lamb initially sued B & B only and, after B & B

so identified Curtis as the seller of the bolt that allegedly
broke, named Curtis as an additional defendant.

10

Third Amended

Complaint, Record at 123-32.

In that pleading Ms. Lamb assert-

ed claims against Curtis sounding in strict liability (Record
at 128-29) and in negligence (Record at 129-30).
6.

On or about February 5, 1990, B & B filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment.
7.

On or about May 11, 1990, Curtis filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment.
8.

Record at 153-54.

Record at 221-22.

Judge Rigtrup heard both defendants' Summary Judgment

Motions at the same hearing (Tr. at 1-39).

He granted the

Curtis Motion, apparently for reasons discussed in footnote 3
hereto, pages 7-8 hereof.
9.

With respect to the B & B Motion, Judge Rigtrup ruled

that Ms. Lamb could proceed to trial on her negligence claim.
Record at 520-21.
10.

In response to Interrogatories regarding expert

witnesses, the only responses B & B ever gave were the following:
INTERROGATORY NO. 3 [of Ms. Lamb's First
Set of Interrogatories to B & B]: Identify
all expert witnesses.
ANSWER: Defendants [sic] have not yet
determined whether or not it will call any
expert witnesses. As soon as that decision
has been made, these interrogatories [sic]
will be supplemented and that information
will be provided.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4 [of
Interrogatories]: With
expert witness you have
answer to Interrogatory
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that same set of
respect to each
identified in your
No. 3, state:

(a)

His profession or occupation, and the
field in which he is claimed to be an
expert;

(b)

The formal education and specialized
training he has received in his field;

(c)

Licenses which he now holds authorizing him to practice in his field;

(d)

The professional experience and work
he has had in his field during the
past five years;

(e)

The compensation, if any, he is to
receive for his work and efforts in
connection with this litigation;

(f)

The subject matter on which he is
expected to testify:

(g)

Describe any tests, examinations or
studies he performed:

(h)

The substance of the facts and opinions to which he is expected to testify;

(i)

A summary of the grounds for each such
opinion:

(j)

Identify any written or recorded
statements, reports, documents or
correspondence received from him by
you, or your counsel, agents, or employees;

(k)

Identify all persons who assisted him
in preparing any reports or documents,
in conducting any test, examination or
studies, or in preparing his opinions
or his testimony and describe the
nature of the assistance rendered;

(1)

Describe any previous experience in
his field which involved matters similar to those encountered in this accident ;
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(m)

If he has testified previously as an
expert witness in any court, before
any administrative tribunal, in arbitration proceedings, or before any
governmental or legislative body,
state when, identify on behalf of whom
such testimony was given, state the
opinions and inferences to which he
has testified, the facts and data upon
which the opinions and inferences were
based, and identify before whom such
testimony was given, including for any
adversary proceeding, the names of all
parties, plaintiff and defendant, the
name and division of the court or
other tribunal, the civil action number, the identity and location of the
court and reporter or other custodian
of the pleadings and transcript, the
identity of the lawyers representing
each party and the citation to any
appeals arising out of the trial;

(n)

Identify all articles, treatises,
manuscripts, books or other writings
authorized in whole or in part by him;

(o)

Describe each course taught by him,
identify each instruction for whom the
course was taught, and state the date
of each teaching;

(p)

State whether any professional licenses held by him have been suspended, or
revoked, and if so, identify by whom,
state when, and describe all reasons
for such suspension or revocation.

ANSWER:

Not applicable.

(Emphasis added.)
11.

On or about January 25, 1990, in support of its

Motion for Summary Judgment, B & B submitted the Affidavit of
P. Thomas Blotter.

The only substantive opinions set forth in

that Affidavit are the following:
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7.

That the normal wear experienced by
the bolt would not be observable from
the car performance or from a visual
inspection of the roller coaster.

8.

That if the regular maintenance procedures were followed, they were adequate and the failure of the bolt was
not the result of operation or maintenance practices.

Record at 149.
12.

At no time, prior to trial, did B & B inform

Ms. Lamb, formally or informally, that Dr. Blotter was going to
give the crucial opinion testimony that he ultimately gave (Tr.
at 417-20; 426), to wit: that the bolt B & B purchased from
Curtis was or may have been defective, either in terms of its
having had a "flaw" or its having been a "counterfeit bolt,"
and that those two explanations were the two most likely
explanations for the bolt's failure.
13.

On or about June 14, 1990, Ms. Lamb submitted a

"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' [her son was still in the
case at that time] Position that the Standard of Care for
Common Carriers should be Applied to Defendant B & B Amusements."
14.

Record at 489-94.
On or about August 17, 1990, B & B submitted, in

response to that Memorandum and by way of setting forth its own
view with respect to which standard of care should apply,
"Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Position that
the Standard of Ordinary Care should be Applied to B & B
14

Amusements."
15.

Record at 271-82.

In the course of a pre-trial meeting in chambers,

Judge Rigtrup determined to adopt B & B's position with respect
to the appropriate standard of care and to reject Ms. Lamb's.
E.g., Tr. at 494-95.

The ordinary care standard was the

standard used in the instructions to the jury.

Jury Instruc-

tion No. 12, Record at 374.
16.

On or about August 13, 1990, Ms. Lamb submitted her

First Motion in Limine.

Record at 539-40.

That Motion asked,

among other things, "that the Court rule that B & B had an
extraordinary duty of care, with respect to plaintiffs, commensurate with that of a common carrier"; and
that the Court rule, as suggested in plaintiff s' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs7
Objection to Curtis Industries7 Proposed
Order and Judgment, dated June 11, 1990
[Record at 497-500], that (the Court having
heretofore granted defendant Curtis Industries, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment)
B & B should not be allowed to, and may
not, seek to adduce evidence in any way
related to a supposedly defective bolt
(please note that B & B has stated, under
oath, in answers to Interrogatories, that
it purchased the bolt in guestion from
defendant Curtis Industries).
17.

On or about August 16, 1990, B & B filed its "Objec-

tion to Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine."

Record at

.4

In that submission, B & B argued, without mentioning

4

For whatever reason, this submission appears not to be
included in the Record. A copy is attached hereto, at pages
12-15 of the Appendix.
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Dr. Blotters proposed testimony, as follows:
Defendant B & B has maintained throughout
the course of this litigation that the bolt
utilized in the connector between the cars
failed in this application. Plaintiffs
have produced no rationale why that evidence, as testified to by the witnesses in
their depositions, should not be presented
to the jury. The reasonable inferences
that the iurv may or may not draw from that
is left to the sound discretion of the
jury.
Record at
18.

(see footnote 4) .

(Emphasis added.)

Ms. Lamb then submitted "Plaintiffs' Reply to B i B's

Objection to Plaintiffs' First and Second Motions in Limine."
Record at 309-14. That submission included, in pertinent part,
the following:
With respect to paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs7
First Motion in Limine (seeking to prevent
B & B from presenting evidence relating to
[a] supposedly "defective" bolt), plaintiffs are of the view that the appropriate
resolution will be for the Court to allow
the B & B agents to describe what they
claim they saw (i.e., for at least one of
B & B's agents, a part of a broken bolt),
but that B & B should not be allowed to
attempt to produce evidence or make direct
commentary regarding the supposedly "defective" bolt. Plaintiffs rely, in this regard, on the following, in addition to the
reasons set forth in their initial Motion:
Interrogatory No. 11 of Plaintiffs' First
Set of Interrogatories provides:
State whether you claim that the roller coaster was in any way defective at
the time of the accident and, if so,
describe in detail and with particularity the nature of all defects.
B & B answered as follows:
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Defendant has not yet determined
whether or not any part of the roller
coaster was defective at the time of
the accident. If defendant claims
that the roller coaster was defective,
this information will be supplemented
to provide that information.
This answer has not been supplemented, in
any fashion.
Record at 310-11.

That Answer to that Interrogatory was never

supplemented.
19.

At trial, as indicated hereinabove, Judge Rigtrup

instructed the jury on the simple negligence, ordinary standard
of care, as opposed to the common carrier, extraordinarily high
standard of care.
20.

Record at 374.

At trial, counsel for B & B, in the course of cross-

examining Ms. Lamb's expert witness on liability, raised the
question of whether "there might be a problem with the bolt
itself, with the actual manufacture of [the] bolt."
2 03.

Tr. at

Later in the course of that cross-examination, the

following exchange occurred between B & B's counsel, Ms. Lamb's
counsel, and the Court:
Q. [by B & B's counsel]: Excuse me. Weren't there some problems — haven't there
been some problems with some imported Taiwanese bolts that had improper markings and
were defective and causing problems in this
area?
[Ms. Lamb's counsel]: I think it has been
established in this case, through discovery, that there is no contention, in this
lawsuit and there is [sic] no facts to
support the proposition, that there was any
defect in manufacture involved here. . . .
17

[The Court]:

Overruled.

Proceed.

Tr. at 222.
21.

In the course of the direct examination of Dr. Tom

Blotter, B & B's expert, the Court allowed, over Ms. Lamb's
counsels objection5 (Tr. at 417), Dr. Blotter to testify about
the possibility of flaws and counterfeit bolts (Tr. at 417 to
420) and that the two most likely explanations for the failure
were "flaw" and "counterfeit" bolt.
22.

Tr. at 426.

As reflected in the Judgment on the Verdict, dated

September 18, 1990 (Record at 401-04), six of the eight jurors
determined that B & B was not negligent and, accordingly, Judge
Rigtrup entered a Judgment of No Cause of Action against
Ms. Lamb and in favor of B & B.
23.

Ms. Lamb then filed her Motion for a New Trial, along

with a supporting Memorandum (Record at 412-30), and the
affidavit of her undersigned trial counsel (with respect to the
testimony of Dr. Blotter) (Record at 410-11).

B & B filed its

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial
(Record at 435-44), along with the affidavit of its trial
counsel (with respect to the testimony of Dr. Blotter) (Record
at 445-47).

Curtis submitted its Memorandum in Opposition to

5

No Transcript mention is made of Ms. Lamb's counsel's
objection, per se, but the context of the sidebar conference
requested (Tr. at 417; lines 10-11) is quite clear, especially
in light of the above-cited record of earlier proceedings in
this case.
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Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (Record at 431-34).
Ms. Lamb submitted her reply memoranda to the memoranda of both
defendants (Record at 452-64 with respect to B & B and Record
at

6

with respect to Curtis).

Oral argument was had on

Ms. Lamb's Motion, and Judge Rigtrup denied the Motion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error in granting the
Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment.

Ms. Lamb's claims against

Curtis sounded in both strict liability and negligence.

Record

evidence existed and was brought to Judge Rigtrup's attention,
in the course of the Curtis Summary Judgment Motion proceedings, to support the proposition, for purposes relevant to the
Curtis Summary Judgment Motion, that the injuries complained of
by Ms. Lamb may have come about, at least in part, by virtue of
the breaking of a defective bolt.

The mere fact that

Ms. Lamb's expert was of the view (as set forth in his Affidavit (Record at 166-67) and deposition testimony), that the
failure was solely the result of B & B's negligence, was not
dispositive on the issues of Curtis's liability.

Ms. Lamb's

expert's holding and giving that opinion did not mandate
dismissal of the claims against Curtis, especially in the face
of B & B's contention, made in its own Motion for Summary

6

For whatever reason, this submission appears not to be
included in the Record. A copy is included herewith, at pages
16-18 of the Appendix.
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Judgment, that its people followed a satisfactory and nonnegligent regimen of maintenance and inspection and that that
rendered B & B non-negligent.

Judge Rigtrup should have

followed clear precedent from other jurisdictions and nearly
clear precedent from this Court and should havef accordingly,
denied the Curtis Motion.

Ms. Lamb is entitled to go to trial

against Curtis.
II.
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error when he rejected
Ms. Lamb's contention that the standard on which the jury
should be instructed, with respect to B 4 B's alleged negligence, was the extraordinarily high standard to which common
carriers are held.

There isf as of yetf no Utah appellate

court law with respect to the standard of care demanded of
amusement park operators.

This Court should follow the better

view and adopt, in the interest of sound public policy, the
extraordinarily high standard adopted by other states and
should lay down the law that Utah amusement park ride operators
are to be held to that high standard.

This Court should remand

this matter for a new trial against B & B on that basis alone.
III.
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error, in the circumstances and dynamics of this case, in allowing Dr. Tom Blotter,
B & B's liability expert, to testify that the subject bolt may
have been "flawed" or "counterfeit" and to testify that the two
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most likely causes of failure were (a) that the bolt was
"flawed" and (b) that the bolt was "counterfeit."

Contrary to

the letter and spirit of Rule 33(a) and Rule 26(e)(1) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, B & B failed to notify Ms. Lamb,
in timely fashion, prior to trial, that Dr. Blotter would
testify as he did.

In the circumstances of this case, Ms. Lamb

was unfairly and prejudicially surprised by such testimony.
When it came out she had no meaningful opportunity to rebut it.
If Dr. Blotter had not been allowed to testify as he did, there
would have been, from any reasonable perspective, given the
other trial evidence, a legally insufficient basis for the jury
to conclude that B & B was not negligent.

This is especially

true given the fact that the Court properly instructed the jury
on res ipsa loquitur with respect to B & B and, by doing so,
informed the jury, in essence, that B & B was legally obligated
to come forward with evidence reasonably countering the inference of negligence.
IV.
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error in denying
Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New Trial against both defendants.

In

the context of Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New Trial and proceedings appertaining thereto, Ms. Lamb brought to Judge Rigtrup's
attention errors of law which had been the subject of pre-trial
proceedings (the granting of the Curtis Motion for Summary
Judgment and the decision to instruct the jury on the simple
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negligence standard of care), as well as a ruling made, in the
course of trial, over Ms. Lamb's pre-trial and trial objections, to allow Dr. Blotter to testify as he did.

In that

Motion for a New Trial, Ms. Lamb also argued that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury's 6-2 verdict of nonnegligence.

Judge Rigtrup's failure to order a new trial, in

the circumstances and dynamics of this case, constitutes an
abuse of discretion and a basis independent from the foregoing
three points to order a new trial against both defendants.
V.
This Court should order a new trial against both defendants, even if it finds that the only reversible error that
Judge Rigtrup committed was in granting the Curtis Motion for
Summary Judgment.

This is not a criminal case to which princi-

ples of double jeopardy attach.

Public policy and fundamental

fairness dictate that Ms. Lamb's claims against B & B be
retried even if this Court determines that no reversible error
was committed with respect to the claims against B & B, so that
Curtis will not be able to do what B & B did in the first
trial, which is to point at an "empty chair" in the courtroom.

Ms. Lamb did nothing wrong.

She was injured, to one

degree or another, either as a result of a defectively or
negligently manufactured bolt or as a result of negligence of
the operator of the roller coaster, or both.
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It makes no sense

that she has, to date, been denied recovery.

She should be

allowed to go to trial against both defendants simultaneously.
A contrary result would work a continued frustration of
the doing of justice in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN GRANTING THE CURTIS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
As is suggested in the foregoing discussion, there came a
time in this litigation, after Curtis had been named as a
defendant and after Ms. Lamb's liability expert, David
Stephens, had been deposed, that Curtis Industries, the manufacturer of the subject bolt, filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The Memorandum of Curtis Industries (Record at 214-

20) offered utterly no legal authority in support of that
Motion.

It appears to have been based solely on the notion

that Ms. Lamb's expert was of the view that it was B & B's
negligence, rather than Curtis's allegedly defective bolt,
which caused the accident.

The mere fact that an expert, even

a plaintiff's expert holds such a view is, however, not dispos
itive and should not have been so viewed by Judge Rigtrup.
This is especially true in a case, such as this, where there
was record evidence (here, the B & B assertions that they did
everything right, from a maintenance and inspection perspective) of contrary factual assertions.
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See, e.g., Hughes v.

American Jawa, Ltd,, 529 F.2d 21, 23-25 (8th Cir. 1975);
Webster v. Offshore Food Service, I n c . 434 F.2d 1191# 1193
(5th Cir. 1970); Gillentine v. McKeand, 426 F.2d 717, 722 (1st
Cir. 1970); Elliott v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 388
F.2d 362, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1968); G. D. Searle & Co. v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co.. 231 F.2d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1956); Castleberrv v.
Collierville Med. Ass., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 492, 494 (W. D. Tenn.
1981).

B & B contended, at the same summary judgment stage of

the proceedings, that the bolt broke and that it was not
negligent and offered record evidence in support of those
propositions.

See B & B's Memorandum in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment, at 2-4 (Record at 137-42).

Ms* Lamb also

brought such things to the District Courts attention, in
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Curtis Industries'
Motion for Summary Judgment (Record at 230) and in the course
of the oral argument on the Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tr. at 33-34).

The fact that Ms. Lamb's expert happened to

agree with the contention advanced by Curtis Industries should
not, especially on the record established in this case at that
time, have caused the District Court to conclude that the
Curtis Motion should be granted.
Judge Rigtrup should have recognized, in short, that it
was for the jury to determine whether Curtis or B & B, or both,
was or were liable in damages to Ms. Lamb who, unquestionably,
did nothing wrong in connection with the subject incident.
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As Ms. Lamb contended in her Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Objection to Curtis Industries' Proposed Order and
Judgment (Record at 497-500), by way of response to some things
that came up in the course of the oral argument on the Curtis
Motion, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied
against two or more defendants in joint control of the instrumentality in question.

See, First National Bank of Arizona v.

Otis Elevator Co., 406 P.2d 430, 435 (Ariz. 1965); Jackson v.
H. H. Robertson Co.. 574 P.2d 822, 825-26 (Ariz. 1978).

As

Ms. Lamb's undersigned counsel sought to explain to Judge
Rigtrup, control over the bolt in question was exercised,
first, by Curtis Industries during the manufacturing stage.
Any negligent (and/or strict liability-related) conduct, with
respect to the manufacture of the bolt, would have occurred
during the time the bolt was in the control of Curtis.
bolt was sold directly by Curtis to B & B.

The

Judge Rigtrup

should have recognized that it was wrong to grant summary
judgment to a party (Curtis) whose acts or omissions were, by
the process of elimination, the cause of Ms. Lamb's injuries
if, indeed, (as the jury ultimately found) the other possible
actor (B & B Amusements) was found to be non-negligent and nonliable.

Judge Rigtrup should certainly have recognized, as

Ms. Lamb ardently sought to convince him, that, consistent with
the spirit of the res ipsa doctrine, the burden should have
been placed on Curtis (as it ultimately was, at the trial,
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placed on B & B) to show that it was not liable when Ms. Lamb
was in an inferior position in terms of her ability to prove
negligence or strict liability against Curtis.

See, Siealer v.

Kuhlman, 473 P.2d 445, 449-450 (Wash. App. 1970), reversed on
other grounds, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
Ms. Lamb also brought to the attention of Judge Rigtrup,
by her submission entitled "Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum
in Opposition to Curtis Industries' Proposed Order and Judgment" (Record at 506-19), the fact that certain well-reasoned
cases of some other jurisdictions pointed the way toward the
Judge Rigtrup's recognizing that it would be inappropriate and
contrary to the interests of justice, in the circumstances of
this case, to cut loose the manufacturer of the bolt.

The

cases are Anderson v. Somberg. 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1974), and
Ybarra v. Spanaard. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1945).

Copies of both

were attached to plaintiff's said Supplemental Memorandum.
Both of those cases addressed the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine when multiple defendants are involved in a
tort case.
Ybarra involved a patient who was injured during the
course of a surgical operation.

The plaintiff in that case

brought suit against several health care providers who participated in his care and who might have caused his injuries.

The

defendants' two primary defenses to the application of res ipsa
were:

(1) that where there are several defendants, where there
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is a division of responsibility in the use of an instrumentality causing the injury, and where the injury might have resulted
from the separate act of one of two or more persons, the rule
of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked against any one of them;
and (2) that where there are several instrumentalities, and no
showing is made as to which caused the injury or as to the
particular defendant in control of it, the doctrine cannot
apply.

Id. at 688-89.

The California Supreme Court, more than 45 years prior to
Judge Rigtrup's ruling, rejected those defenses to the application of res ipsa loquitur and held that neither the number of
defendants nor the relationship of defendants alone determines
whether the doctrine applies.

Id. at 690. That court criti-

cized a limited application of res ipsa loquitur because such
an application would "preclude its application . . . in cases
where it is most important that it should be applied."

Id. at

689.
Anderson v. Sombera involved a plaintiff who was injured
during surgery when part of the forceps used during the procedure broke off in his spine.

The plaintiff brought suit

against the doctor, the hospital, the manufacturer, and the
supplier of the forceps.

The New Jersey Supreme Court there

recognized that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had been
expanded to cover multiple defendants even where a plaintiff
could not show that it was more probable than not that the
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injury resulted from the negligence of one particular defendant,

3 38 A.2d at 5.

The Anderson court recognized, some 15

years before Judge Rigtrup granted the Curtis Motion for
Summary Judgment, that the res ipsa doctrine had been expanded
to embrace cases "where the negligence cause was not the only
or most probable theory in the case, but where the alternate
theories of liability [together] accounted for the only possible causes of injury."

Id. (citations omitted).

The Anderson

court noted, furthermore, that in cases of this type, "no
defendant can be entitled to prevail on a motion for judgment
until all the proofs have been presented to the court and
Jury."

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).

Based on the rationale of Ybarra and Anderson, Curtis
should, clearly, not have been granted summary judgment with
respect to Ms. Lamb's claims.

Ms. Lamb should have been

granted a trial against Curtis, on those authorities alone.
Also most instructive on the question of whether the
Curtis Motion should have been granted are cases such as the
following, all dealing with products liability claims, and all
supporting Ms. Lamb's contention, made before Judge Rigtrup in
connection with the Curtis Motion, that Curtis should not have
been cut loose, by anything other than a jury verdict, in the
dynamics of this case:

Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d

720 (9th Cir. 1986); Hiqains v. General Motors Corp., 699
S.W.2d 741 (Ark. 1985); Fain v. GTE Svlvania. Inc.. 652 S.W.2d
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163 (Mo. App. 1983).
Ms. Lamb is of the view that all of these non-Utah authorities point, quite clearly, toward the correctness of the
proposition that she had advanced a claim easily sufficient to
defeat the summary judgment contentions of Curtis.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, with respect to the
Curtis Motion, Ms. Lamb also bring to the Court's attention its
own opinion in Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center,
791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990).

Dalley was a multiple-defendant case

dealing with alleged medical malpractice.

This Court, after

favorably discussing such cases as Ybarra (Id. at 198-99), had
the following to say with respect to the matter of "multipledefendant liability":
The second issue on appeal is whether multiple defendants may be held liable under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, thus
relieving plaintiff of showing that particular defendants were involved. The very
purpose of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to allow a plaintiff who is unaware
of the circumstances of his or her injury
to establish the elements of negligence,
including the possible defendants.
Consistent with our opinion above, we hold
that where the foundation of res ipsa loguitur is established, all defendants who
are charged with the safety of a helpless
patient may be held liable where the only
possible instrumentalities that could cause
injury were within the defined area of an
operating room under the control of all
defendants and where the injury occurred to
a part of the plaintiff's body not involved
in the operation itself. Without some
further explanation by defendants of how
plaintiff was injured, they are considered
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in control of the instrumentality, including the hospital and the anesthesiologist.
If any defendant can come forward with a
conclusive exculpatory statement or explanation of how the injury occurred, then the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not
apply because there is no longer a need for
an inference of negligence or causation.
The justification for placing the inference
of negligence and cause upon defendants in
lieu of an explanation of how the injury
occurred arises from the necessity to protect their rights of an innocent and helpless patient.
Id. at 200 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The unanimous Dalley Court cited, in footnote 23, the case
of Siealer v. Kuhlman, 473 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. App. 1970),
reversed on other grounds. 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), discussed hereinabove.

Ms. Lamb recognizes that this is not a

medical malpractice case and that the alleged fault of Curtis
did not occur at the same time as the alleged fault of B & B.
She submits, however, that those facts are irrelevant when one
understands the dynamics and purpose of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.

See. Jackson v. H. H. Robertson Co.. 574 P.2d 822,

825-26 (Ariz. 1979).

She suggests that it is unlikely that,

strictly speaking, the alleged misdeeds of the various health
care professionals named as defendants in Dalley occurred,
literally, at the same time.

She suggests that the correct

inquiry has to do with the universe of people in control of the
subject situation.

She suggests that, just as the various

health care professionals involved in the care of the patient
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in Dalley were, to one degree or another, in one capacity or
another, and at one specific time or another, "in control" of
the care of the patient in that case, Curtis and B & B were, on
the record herein, the only two entities "controlling" the fate
of Ms, Lamb.

There is no good reason, in law or in logic, why

this situation should be treated differently from the situation
in Dalley.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO IMPOSE
ON B & B A STANDARD OF CARE TANTAMOUNT
TO THAT IMPOSED ON COMMON CARRIERS.
The primary rationale for an increased standard of care —
"the highest degree of care, skill, and diligence," the "highest practicable care," "extraordinary care and caution," —
C.J.S. Carriers, §678 —
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appears to be that paying passengers

surrender themselves, for pay, to the care and custody of the
carrier in question.
and actions.

They give up their freedom of movement

They are, generally, unable to prevent accidents.

See, Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 396 P.2d 933, 939 (Colo.
1964).

The application of common sense suggests that these

same considerations apply when one surrenders herself to the
care of the operator of an amusement ride.
Some courts have been willing to apply the highest standard of care, which common carriers owe to their passengers, to
operators of certain amusement rides and devices.

4 Am.Jur.2d,

Amusements and Exhibitions, §88. E.g.. Paiak v. Mamsch. 87
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N.E.2d 147 (111, 1949) (operator of a ferris wheel held to the
standard of care of a common carrier); Best Park & Amusement
Co, v, Rollins, 68 So. 417 (Ala. 1915) (operator of a scenic
railway held to the same high degree of care that was required
of a common carrier).

Some courts have applied the common

carrier standard of care specifically to roller coaster and
scenic railway rides.

See, Cooper v. Winnwood Amusement Co..

55 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1932) (roller coaster operator must use the
highest degree of care for passengers/ safety) ; Eiibeau v. Fred
W. Pearce Corp. , 217 N.W. 374 (Minn. 1928) (operators of a
roller coaster or scenic railway owe passengers the highest
degree of skill and diligence) ; Q/Callaahan v. Dcsllwood Park
Co. . 89 N.E. 1005 (111. 1909) (common carrier standard of care
to be applied to operator of scenic railroad).
The upshot of these cases is that, even though the operator of an amusement ride may not, technically, meet the classic
definition of a common carrier, numerous courts have been
willing to impose the common carrier standard of care on
amusement ride operators by reason of the fact that passengers
of the rides in question have essentially entrusted their
safety to the care and custody of the amusement ride operators,
just as passengers of universally recognized "common carriers,"
such as bus, train, or airline companies, have implicitly
entrusted their safety to the care and custody of those carriers.
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Although there is no case law in Utah concerning whether a
roller coaster operator should be held to the same high standard to which a traditionally recognized common carrier is
heldf Ms. Lamb believes that the reasoning of the above-cited
cases is sound and points the way toward the appropriateness of
the imposition of the highest standard of care on B S B's
roller coaster operation.

"It is not important whether [the]

defendant [was] serving as a common carrier or [was] engaged in
activities for amusement."

Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's. Inc.. 396

P.2d at 939 (Colo. 1964).

The important factors include these:

"the plaintiffs had surrendered themselves to the care and
custody of the defendant; they had given up their freedom of
movement and actions; [and] there was nothing they could do to
cause or prevent the accident."

Id.

These factors appear,

unquestionably, to apply to the conditions of Ms. Lamb at the
time of the incident.
The question of whether a passenger on a conveyance-forhire, such as a bus, a train, or a plane —
ride —

or an amusement

is picked up at "point A" and dropped off at "point B"

(as opposed to —

for hire —

being picked up at "point A" and,

after whatever thrilling, scintillating, or interesting excursion, returned to "point A") is, for purposes germane to the
present world at large, as well as for purposes specific to the
instant dispute, simply irrelevant.

Just as thousands of

people, on an annual basis, travel on jetliners from Salt Lake
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City to Hawaii and back again purely for "recreation," a person
who rides an amusement ride, such as that which was ridden by
Ms. Lamb and her son, is riding solely for recreational purposes.

The fact that there may be a "destination stop," however

brief or lengthy, in Hawaii, prior to the return trip, should
not make the recreational trip to Hawaii any more significant,
for purposes of the present discussion, than the kiddie roller
coaster ride (which did not include a planned stopover), that
was supposed to be enjoyed by Ms. Lamb and her son.

The key

consideration, as the better cases, discussed hereinabove, have
recognized, is that one such as Ms. Lamb totally surrenders and
entrusts herself to the expertise, care, inspection ability,
maintenance ability, and operating ability of an operating
entity such as B & B, and hopes to be safely transported (as a
function of that surrendering and entrustment) from the point
of the beginning of her excursion to the point of its expected
safe conclusion.

The fact that she is not, for some interim

(however long or short), being deposited for business, further
recreational, or other purposes, before her putative return
trip begins (here to the starting point of the ride) should be
recognized, as Judge Rigtrup failed to recognize it, as utterly
insignificant.
The significance of the instruction, which Ms. Lamb would
have proposed for inclusion in the jury's charge, if Judge
Rigtrup had not ruled, prior to trial, that the ordinary
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negligence standard applied to the amusement park ride in
question, cannot be overstated.

The stock "JIFU" (Jury In-

struction Forms/Utah) instruction, relating to the "Duty of
Common Carrier Toward Passenger," JIFU 31.6, based on law laid
down by Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.. 147 P.2d 875
(Utah 1944), and Johnson v. Lewis. 240 P.2d 498 (Utah 1952),
provides:
As a common carrier the defendant . . . was
required by law to use the highest degree
of care for the safe carriage of plaintiff,
to provide everything reasonably necessary
for that purpose and to exercise a reasonable degree of skill.
(Emphasis added.)
If Judge Rigtrup had, as he should have, ultimately
employed this language, or something substantially similar to
it, rather than the "ordinary care" language that he did use in
his charge, the jury would reasonably have been expected, in
the context of this case, to have found B & B negligent.
If such a correct instruction had been given (and if Judge
Rigtrup had ruled, in the course of the pre-trial proceedings,
that such an instruction would be given), the complexion of the
case would have changed dramatically.

Ms. Lamb would then have

been able to present evidence and to argue, against the backdrop of such an instruction, that B & B simply did not do
everything reasonably imaginable that it could have done and
should have done, in connection with (without limitation) such
things as testing the bolts it used, inspecting the bolts on a
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more frequent and more thorough basis than was donef and more
frequently replacing, on a routine basis, the bolts in use (not
to mention, in the above-emphasized language of the form
instruction, "provid[ing] everything [including safe bolts]
reasonably necessary for [the] purpose [of Ms. Lamb's 'safe
carriage7]").

In light of the "ordinary care" instruction

which Judge Rigtrup determined, prior to the commencement of
the evidence (Record at 494-95), to give, Ms. Lamb was foreclosed from focusing on "utmost care" areas of inquiry, in the
course of the evidentiary phase of the trial, and from arguing,
in the course of her summation, that B & B failed to act in
accordance with the "highest" standard of care.

Judge

Rigtrup7s pre-trial ruling that the ordinary care standard,
rather than the common carrier standard, was applicable to B &
B's operation of the roller coaster was, thus, not only erroneous, but also most harmfully so.
POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING MS. LAMB'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
It is Ms. Lamb's contention that, in addition to the
errors discussed hereinabove, that Judge Rigtrup erred when he
allowed Dr. Blotter, B & B's expert, to testify, as he did,
concerning the supposedly "flawed" or "counterfeit" bolt; that
that evidence, and the allowance thereof, constituted a prejudicial surprise to Ms. Lamb; that, without that testimony,
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there would have been insufficient evidence, even on a simple
negligence basis, to support the jury's verdict, and that Judge
Rigtrup erred, given those circumstances, in denying Ms. Lamb's
Motion for a New Trial.
A. Dr. Blotter's Testimony Should Not
Have Been Allowed And It Constituted
Prejudicial Surprise.
As Ms. Lamb's recitation of certain aspects of the procedural history of this case (see discussion at pages 11 to 17
hereof) should make clear, she was surprised by and prejudiced
by Judge Rigtrup's decision to allow Dr. Blotter to testify as
he did.

Not only had B & B failed, prior to trial (in viola-

tion of the letter and spirit of Rules 33(a) and 26(e)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), to disclose the substance
of Dr. Blotter's factual inquiry and opinions in response to
Interrogatories.

B & B had also, less than two weeks before

trial, given out the clear signal that it would be offering no
"defect" testimony of the kind Dr. Blotter gave.7

This led

Ms. Lamb to believe that B & B's defense to the claim of
negligence would be limited to their own employees' testifying
that they found part of a broken bolt, that the bolt they found
must have been the bolt that they claim broke, and that they
adhered to a regular inspection and maintenance process.

See,

also, the Affidavit of Dr. Blotter (Record at 149), in which
7

Please see footnote 4 (p. 15) hereof and emphasized
portion, appearing at page 16 hereof, of B & B's "Objection to
Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine."
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the only opinions he offered were that, (a) the normal wear
experienced by the bolt would not be observable from the car
performance or from a visual inspection of the coaster, and
that (b) if B & B adhered to its inspection and maintenance
procedures, those procedures were adequate and the failure was
not the result of operation or maintenance practices.

Blotter

Affidavit, paragraphs 7 and 8.
B. In The Absence Of Dr. Blotter's
Testimony, There Would Not Have Been
Reasonably Sufficient Evidence To Overcome
The Inference Of B & B's Negligence.
Judge Rigtrup correctly instructed the jury on res ipsa
loquitur.

Jury Instruction Number 14 (Record at 377-78).

Except for the testimony of Dr. Blotter (a rocket scientist, Tr. at 380-83) that the failure of the roller coaster
most likely occurred because of a flawed or counterfeit bolt
(Tr. at 426), the evidence pointed clearly to the conclusion
that B & B was negligent.

Dr. Blotter did not even testify, at

trial, concerning his summary-judgment stage, affidavit-given
opinion (Record at 149) that the maintenance and inspection
procedures were reasonable and that if such procedures were
followed, there was no negligence.

Nor did Dr. Blotter did

testify, at trial, despite B & B's counsel's persistent efforts
to adduce such testimony, that, in his opinion, B & B was not
negligent with respect to its maintenance, inspection, and
operation of the coaster (Tr. at 426-31).

38

1.

The deposition testimony (read at trial) of Stephen

J. "Corky" Mertin IV (Buddy Mertin's son, the Safety Coordinator and their man in charge of maintenance for the First Unit
(including the subject roller coaster, Tr. at 43-44) that "you
just give [the roller coaster] a visual inspection for cracks
and bolts and worn areas and things" (Tr. at 50);8
2.

The testimony of Al Scanlin that ride inspections

were done on a daily basis (Tr. at 295-97; 320) (Mr. Scanlin
also testified (Tr. at 308-09) regarding Corky Mertin's supposed role in repairing the ride after the subject incident, in
contradistinction to Corky Mertin's abject lack of memory (Tr.
at 54-57) of the details surrounding the incident); and
3.

Buddy Mertin's (B & B's president's) testimony that

the connecting bolts were replaced every spring (Tr. at 93);
that his men were trained to inspect the rides every day (Tr.
at 64; 93-94; 101-04); that if they did not do so and did not
turn in their inspection sheets to prove that they had done
their inspections, they would not get clean shirts or their pay
(Tr. at 132); and that the part of the bolt that was supposedly
found showed no unusual wear (Tr. at 108) or no wear at all
(Tr. at 131).
On the other side of the equation, on a sufficiency-ofevidence analysis, is the evidence that Ms. Lamb adduced in

8

Corky did not remember why the cars separated.

57.
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Tr. at

(Tr. at 131).
On the other side of the equation, on a sufficiency-ofevidence analysis, is the evidence that Ms. Lamb adduced in
support of her contention that B & B was negligent.

That

evidence includes:
1.

The lengthy testimony of her expert, David Stephens,

culminating in his opinion that the bolt either (a) fell out
because it was not tightened properly or (b) broke only after
manifesting a condition of imminent failure that would have
been readily observable to a reasonably vigilant B & B employee, prior to the failure itself (Tr. at 204-10); and
2.

The fact (Trial Exhibit P-l) that inspections appear

in fact to have been done on only a very sporadic basis and
that no inspection had been done between August 2, 1986 and
September 4, 1996 (the date of the accident) (see, especially,
the last page of Trial Exhibit P-l; see, also. Tr. at 95-96).
The ride was operated at three or four other stops between
those dates.

Tr. at 120.

Buddy Mertin's explanation for the

paucity of inspection records was that there had been a truck
rollover in which certain records had been lost (Tr. at 122-24)
(neither side sought to put on other evidence, through Utah
Highway Patrol accident investigation reports or otherwise, of
this supposed occurrence) and that the B & B people who were
supposed to do the inspections and fill out the inspection
reports were not exactly "college graduates."
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Tr. at 136.

B & B's Al Scanlin acknowledged (Tr. at 315) that pieces of
paper, unless they were "missing," would be the only proof that
inspections had, in fact, taken place.

Perhaps the most

telling of evidence, in connection with B & B's supposed nonnegligence and in connection, especially, with the question of
whether Buddy Mertin was reasonably credible with respect to
his testimony that the inspections were in fact done on a daily
basis, was the testimony of B & B's own Mr. Scanlin, its ride
supervisor (whose duties included supervision of inspections
(Tr. at 295)).

When asked about another area of Mr. Mertin's

testimony (Tr. at 132) —

that the inspections were done on a

daily basis and the inspection reports were turned in on a
daily basis because, if they weren't, his men would receive
neither clean shirts nor their pay —

Mr. Scanlin (who was, as

ride supervisor, presumably B & B's main person with respect to
the inspection and safety program) testified (Tr. at 314) that
he had no knowledge of any such policy.
There was, in sum, absent Dr. Blotter's crucial testimony,
utterly no credible evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that B & B was not negligent.
In these circumstances, Judge Rigtrup should have recognized, prior to or in response to Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New
Trial, that a miscarriage of justice had been done.

He should

have ordered a new trial for Ms. Lamb against both defendants.
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His failure to do so constituted, in the most unusual circumstances of this case, an abuse of discretion.

VJhen the verdict

came back as it did, Judge Rigtrup should have righted the
wrongs which began when he granted the Curtis Motion for
Summary Judgment, which continued when he ruled that the jury
would be instructed on an ordinary care standard, which continued through his allowing Dr. Blotter to testify as he did, and
which culminated in the jury's verdict.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Lamb implores this Court to recognize what has happened in this case and to recognize, particularly, that she was
a fare-paying passenger (Tr. at 264) who rode on the kiddie
coaster (consistent with B & B policy; Tr. at 139) for the
purposes of a fun ride with her young son; that through utterly
no fault of her own the cars separated and she was injured; and
that, in these circumstances, she is entitled to recover
something from somebody.
As contended hereinabove, she believes that grievous
errors were committed at various stages of the proceedings and
that those issues together worked to allow a palpably unjust
result to be worked in this case to date.

She urges this Court

to correct those errors and to rule that she be allowed to go
to trial, simultaneously, against both defendants, and to let a
new jury sort out and determine the issues of strict liability,
negligence, and causation.
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If this Court recognizes that it was reversible error for
Judge Rigtrup to have granted the Curtis Motion for Summary
Judgment but determines, for whatever reason, that no reversible error was committed with respect, specifically, to
Ms. Lamb's claims against B & B, she urges the Court nonetheless to adopt the wise approach taken by the Court in
Westinahouse Elevator Co. v. Herron, 523 A.2d 723, 728 (Pa.
1987), and to order that a new trial against both defendants be
held.

Her concern is that, if she is afforded a new trial

against Curtis only, the roles between B & B and Curtis will
simply be reversed; Curtis will be able to point to the empty
chair that should be occupied by B & B and effectively contend,
before that new jury, that the failure was the fault of B & B;
and her nightmare of injustice will likely continue.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1991.

WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

Petter C. Collins
Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TAMMY HERRING, an individual,
and as Guardian Ad Litem for
Anthony Herring,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. C 86-7252
vs.
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., and
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., an
Ohio corporation,
Defendants.

The Motion of defendant Curtis Industries, Inc. came on
regularly for a hearing pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Judicial
Council Rules of Judicial Administration on June 4, 1990. The
plaintiffs were represented by their lawyer, Peter C. Collins, of
the law firm of Winder & Haslam.

Curtis Industries, Inc. was

represented by its lawyer, Robert H. Henderson, of the law firm
Snow, ChristensenfieMartineau.

The Court had previously reviewed

the file, including all memoranda.
oral argument of counsel.

The Court fully heard the

The Court being fully advised in the

premises, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:

that the Motion for

Summary Judgment of Curtis Industries, Inc. be, and hereby is
granted.
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that:
Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor of defendant
Curtis Industries, Inc. and against plaintiffs, no cause of
action.
DATED this

__J*\3> day of June, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

IETH RIGTRUP^
DMJTRICT COURT JUDGE
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The

terms

"negligence",

|ft

"ordinary

care",

and "proximate

cause", as used in these instructions, are defined as follows:
A.
prudent

"Negligence" means the failure to
person

would

have

do what

done under the circumstances of the

situation, or doing what such person under such
stances would not have done.
acting or omitting to act.

a reasonably

existing circum-

The essence of the fault may lie in

The duty is dictated and

measured by

the exigencies of the occasion.
B.

"Ordinary

care"

is

that

reasonably prudent person would use
circumstances.

"Ordinary

degree
under

care"

of

the

care
same

implies

the

which

a

or similar
exercise

of

reasonable diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight
as under

all the

circumstances of

the particular case would be

exercised by a reasonably careful, prudent person.
You will note that the person whose conduct
standard is
exceptionally

we set

up as a

not the extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the
skillful

ordinary prudence.

one,

but

a

person

of

reasonable and

While exceptional caution and skill are to be

admired and encouraged, the law does not demand them as a general
standard of conduct.
C.

By

"proximate

cause"

is

meant that cause which in a

natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced
the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.
The law

does not

necessarily recognize

only one proximate

cause of an injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, or

00374
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Page Two

^

the conduct

of only

one person,

To the contrary, the acts and

omissions of

two or

more persons

may work

any

and in such case, each of the

efficient

cause

of

injury,

concurrently as the

participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proximate
cause and both may be held respons ible.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
TAMMY HERRING, an individual
and as Guardian Ad Litem for
Anthony Herring,

JUDGMENT ON THE
VERDICT

Plaintiff,
v.
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., and
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., an
Ohio corporation,

Civil No.

C 86-7252

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.
The above entitled matter came on for trial beginning
August 28, 1990, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

A jury was duly impaneled.

The plaintiff, Tammy

Jean Herring (Lamb), appeared in person and through her attorney,
Peter

C.

Collins.

The defendant,

B & B Amusements

Corp.,

appeared through its president, Steven J. (Buddy) Merten, and
through its attorney Scott W. Christensen.
Evidence was produced by each party through testimony
and

exhibits.

The

court

instructed

the

jury

on

the

law

applicable to the issues of liability and damages.

Counsel for

each of the parties presented closing arguments.
The court then submitted the issues to the jury on
special verdict.

The jury, having retired

to consider the

matter, and after deliberations, returned a special verdict as
follows:
We, the jury in the above entitled case,
deliver the following answers to the
questions submitted to us:
QUESTION NO. 1:
negligent?

Was B & B Amusements

Answer "yes" or "no".
ANSWER:

No.

QUESTION NO. 2: Was B & B Amusements'
negligence a proximate cause of injury to
Tammy Lamb?
Answer "yes" or "no".
ANSWER:
If you answer Question Nos. 1 and 2
"no," sign and return this verdict.
If you answer Question Nos. 1 and 2
"yes," then answer Question No. 3.
QUESTION NO. 3:
What is the total
amount of "Category 1" damages (as defined in
Instruction No.
) suffered by Tammy Lamb
as proximate results of the accident?
ANSWER:
QUESTION NO. 4:
What is the total
amount of "Category 2" damages (as defined in
2

Instruction No.
) suffered by Tammy Lamb
as proximate results of the accident?
ANSWER:
QUESTION NO. 5: Did Ms. Lamb fail, to
any degree, reasonably to mitigate her
damages from the accident?
Answer "yes" or "no".
ANSWER:
If you answer
Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the
following question. If you answer Question
No. 4 "no," sign and return this verdict.
QUESTION NO. 6: By what amount, if any,
do you find that Ms. Lamb failed to mitigate
her damages through reasonable efforts?
ANSWER:
DATED: Sept. 4, 1990

Frank R. Davis
FOREPERSON

Thereafter,

the

received by the court.

special

verdict

to

the

jury

was

The court at the request of plaintiff's

counsel, polled the jury as to each, of the questions answered.
Six of

the eight

jurors affirmed the answer to the special

verdict interrogatory to be their own.
Based upon the jury verdict,

IT

IS HEREBY

ORDERED

in

of

ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
defendant

B

Judgment

is

& B Amusements

hereby

entered

and against

favor

the plaintiff

the
Tammy

Herring (Lamb) Hno cause of action-.
3
f:^/!
'.•.*-#
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2.
established

Defendant is awarded its taxable costs, to be
upon

submission

of

an

affidavit

by

defendant's

attorney, subject to court approval as to the amount.
DATED this

I*

day of September, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

KENNE,TH RIGTRUP//
•
THIRD1 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this

S—

day of September, 1990, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to the following:
Peter C. Collins, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 West 200 South, #4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668
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HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant, B & B Amusements
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
TAMMY HERRING, an individual,

::

Plaintiff,

ORDER

i

V •

J

B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., and
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., an
Ohio corporation,

i Civil No. C 86-7252
j
!: Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

:

Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial, having come before
the court on Monday, November 19, 1990, as regularly scheduled,
plaintiff being represented by Peter C. Collins, defendant Curtis
Industries
defendant

being
B

Christensen;

&

represented

B Amusements

the

court

by

Robert

being

having

H.

Henderson,

represented

heard

oral

by

Scott

argument,

and
W.

having

reviewed the file, and being fully advised in the premises;
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED,

plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial is denied.

AND

DECREED

that

DATED this

-£"

day of

J^^c^'m

. 1990.

BY THE COURT:

• I/?

/ y

KENNETH RIGTRUP /
J
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this

/ /

day of November, 1990, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to the following:
Peter C. Collins, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 West 200 South, #4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668
Robert H. Henderson, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Curtis Industries
10 Exchange Place , 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
f

,
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SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
TAMM? HERRING, an individual
and as Guardian Ad Litem for
Anthony Herring,

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS'
FIRST MOTION IN LIMINE

Plaintiff,
v.
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., and
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., an
Ohio corporation,

Civil No. C 86-7252
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.
COMES NOW the defendant, B & B Amusements Corp., and
responds to Plaintiff's First Motion in Limine.
Defendant objects to plaintiffs' request in paragraph
1 of their motion for a ruling that the principles of res ipsa
loquitur apply to plaintiffs' claims against B & B.
Utah

Rules

of

Evidence,

questions of admissibility generally.

Rule

104(a)

deals

Rule 104(a) states:

Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court subject to the provisions of
subdivision (b).

nm2

with

Plaintiffs' request is outside the scope of Rule 104 and as such,
is improper•
Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' motion requests an express
ruling by the court that David Stephens is qualified to render
the opinions set forth in his affidavit.

This defendant renews

its motion to strike which was previously presented to this
court.

It is B & B's position that Mr. Stephens does not have

the necessary expertise to render opinions in this case.

He has

neither the training nor the experience which would allow him to
render the kinds of opinions found in his affidavit.

It is

therefore respectfully submitted that the court deny paragraph 2
of Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine.
Defendant further objects to paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs'
First Motion in Limine.

In this motion, plaintiffs seek to

prevent B & B from presenting evidence "in any way related to a
supposedly defective bolt".

Defendant B & B has maintained

throughout the course of this litigation that the bolt utilized
in the connector between the cars failed in this application.
Plaintiffs

have produced no rationale/ why 'that evidence, as

testified to by .the witnesses, in their depositions, shonld not be
presented to the jury.

The reasonable interences that the .jury

may or may not draw from that is left to the sound discretion of
the jury.

2

Defendant objects to paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' First
Motion in Limine,

Defendant will submit its memorandum upon the

issue of common carrier liability immediately.
Defendant further objects to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs'
First Motion in Limine.
Curtis Industries.
pleadings.

Plaintiffs have filed an action against

That is a matter of record and is part of the

It certainly is an allegation which they have made

and are preserving their right to pursue.
of

the

trial

this

becomes

an

If during the course

inconsistent

position,

this

defendant feels that such evidence would be relevant to a jury's
evaluation of plaintiffs' claims.
DATED this

f&~

day of August, 1990.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

xr)TVLt
SCOTT WJ CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered
this

jLv^day of August, 1990/ a true and correct copy of the

foregoing to the following:
Peter C. Collins, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 West 200 South, #4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, DT 84110-2668
Mailed

Robert H. Henderson, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN St MARTINEAXJ
Attorneys for Curtis Industries
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

87-483.62
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Peter C. Collins (#0700)
Lincoln W. Hobbs (#4848)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TAMMY HERRING, et ai.,
Plaintiffs,

REPLY MEMORANDUM TO CURTIS
INDUSTRIES' OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL

-vB & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., et al.

Civil No. C86-7252
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

Plaintiff Tammy Herring (Lamb) replies as follows to
Curtis Industries' Memorandum in Opposition to her Motion for a
New Trial:
1.

This case is now, contrary to Curtis Industries'

contention, in a radically "different posture" from the posture
it was in when the Court granted Curtis Industries' Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The trial result, which was a mere unlikely,

possibility when the Court granted that Motion, has now come to
pass: the Court allowed B & B Amusements to put on evidence and
contend that the Curtis bolt was defective; and the jury found
that B & B was not negligent.

2.

As the Court will recall, the Court granted the

Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment because Ms. Lamb was unable
to produce satisfactory evidence that the bolt was defective.
If the bolt was defective, her chance to produce such evidence
was lost when B & B threw the bolt away.
3.
posture."

This case is now not only in a decidedly "different
It is in an absurd posture.

For, either the B & B

bolt was defective, or B & B was negligent, or both.

But Ms.

Lamb has, to date, been denied recovery from either defendant.
She respectfully suggests that something has gone awry and
that, on the facts of this case, our system ought not counteiL

nance such a result.
DATED this

0

day of October, 1990.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

By
Peter C. Collins
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum to Curtis Industries1
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial to be handdelivered on the

o

day of October, 1990 to Robert H.

Henderson, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 10 Exchange Place,

2

Eleventh Floor, Post Office Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah
84145, and Scott W. Christensen, HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, 4
Triad Center, Suite 500, Post Office Box 2970, Salt Lake City,
Utah
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84110-2970.

